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In this review, the neural underpinnings of the experience of presence are outlined. Firstly, it 
is shown that presence is associated with activation of a distributed network, which includes 
the dorsal and ventral visual stream, the parietal cortex, the premotor cortex, mesial temporal 
areas, the brainstem and the thalamus. Secondly, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
is identified as a key node of the network as it modulates the activity of the network and the 
associated experience of presence. Thirdly, children lack the strong modulatory influence of 
the DLPFC on the network due to their unmatured frontal cortex. Fourthly, it is shown that 
presence-related measures are influenced by manipulating the activation in the DLPFC using 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) while participants are exposed to the virtual roller 
coaster ride. Finally, the findings are discussed in the context of current models explaining the 
experience of presence, the rubber hand illusion, and out-of-body experiences.
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INTRODUCTION
Presence is a relatively new concept that, with the 
advent of computer technology, has acquired con-
siderable importance in the effective design of vir-
tual environments that simulate real world events 
and settings. Presence is understood to refer to 
the subjective feeling of being in a virtual environ-
ment while being transiently unaware of one’s real 
location and surroundings and of the technology 
that delivers the stream of virtual input to the 
senses (Vorderer et al., 2004; Wirth et al., 2007). 
The notion of “spatial” presence emphasizes on the 
perception of spatial cues in a mediated environ-
ment and the experience of presence such that the 
person is concurrently “inattentive” to the spatial 
cues of the real physical surroundings. Television, 
radio, and even books, like virtual reality (VR) 
technology, facilitate a sense of spatial presence 
in different ways (IJsselsteijn et al., 2000).
An alternative view on presence proposed 
by Sanchez-Vives and Slater (2005) highlights 
the role of supported actions in the (real or vir-
tual) environment as a constituent feature of 
the experience of reality. The view is elegantly 
expressed by Sanchez-Vives and Slater (2005, p. 
333) that “the key to the approach is that the 
sense of ‘being there’ in a virtual environment 
(VE) is grounded on the ability to ‘do there’”. 
In our view, this ability does not mean that real 
actions must be executed in a VE. A mental rep-
resentation of an action can be automatically 
triggered by the incoming VE stimuli irrespec-
tive of subsequent execution of the action or 
not. Several brain imaging studies have dem-
onstrated that the motor cortex (primary and 
secondary) can be activated by various stimuli 
(including VE stimuli) without resulting in overt 
actions (Baumgartner et al., 2007; Munzert 
et al., 2009). Hence, the motor representations 
of the upcoming movements strongly associated 
with a particular stimuli are most likely used to 
shape perception along with the experience of 
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the stimuli and in particular the perception and 
experience of the VE.
Although the experience of presence in a VE 
is a common phenomenon, the conceptualiza-
tion and measurement of the presence are not 
easy. The assessment of presence is most often 
approached on the basis of post-test question-
naires and rating scales specifically constructed to 
measure subjective presence experience (Witmer 
and Singer, 1998). Physiological measurement of 
heart rate, skin conductance, respiration rate, and 
peripheral skin temperature enables continuous 
assessment of bodily responses during exposure 
to VR environments, and such indices of subjec-
tive responsiveness to virtual stimulation have 
been especially useful in environments that would 
elicit arousal in the real world (Baumgartner et al., 
2006; Meehan et al., 2005; Wiederhold et al., 
2000). Physical activity during exposure to virtual 
stimulation has also been registered and used as 
an indicator of presence. For example, changes in 
posture in response to spatial cues and observed 
motion in a virtual environment may be taken as 
a sign of presence (Freeman et al., 2000). An alter-
native strategy for the measurement of presence 
is based on the idea of “breaks in presence” (BIP). 
A BIP can occur at the moment of attentional 
disengagement from the virtual display and dur-
ing “return” to reality in response to an external 
stimulus or an internal stimulus (Slater and Steed, 
2000). The change of subjective feeling associated 
with a BIP can be registered and taken as evidence 
of presence.
The extensive usage of self-reports of presence 
reflects the importance of evaluating immediate 
subjective experience of presence. The reduced 
reliability of such presence measures (Freeman 
et al., 1999) reflects, in part, the difficulty in both 
retrospectively and explicitly characterizing the 
actual contents of experience and the reliance 
on the perceptual awareness of presence. One 
promising avenue for understanding presence 
uses neuroimaging methods, but only a very few 
studies have explored the neural underpinnings 
of presence. How can such studies contribute to 
the understanding of presence? Firstly, the stud-
ies can uncover the neural networks involved in 
generating and modulating presence. Secondly, 
the studies can demonstrate inter-individual 
differences in the neural activation pattern of 
subjects who report differences in the presence 
experience. Thirdly, it is also possible to track the 
changing activation patterns observed during 
the exposure to VR scenarios, during the course 
of learning and habituation, or as a consequence 
of specific prior experience. Finally, once the 
network involved in presence is delineated, the 
activation of particular nodes of this network 
can be selectively modulated (using transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation: TMS or transcranial 
direct current stimulation: tDCS) to determine 
a specific role of a particular node in modulat-
ing the presence experience. The studies that 
have until now helped to understand the neural 
underpinnings of presence are summarized as 
follows.
INVOLVEMENT OF A NETWORK  
IN THE MODULATION OF PRESENCE
Using a virtual roller coaster scenario, 
Baumgartner et al. (2008) measured the hemo-
dynamic responses with fMRI in a large sample 
of adults and children. Baumgartner and col-
leagues also registered the subjective experi-
ence of presence after each roller coaster ride. 
It is worth mentioning that they used different 
scenarios to control color perception, stereop-
sis, and dynamic aspects of visual perception. 
Consequently, they uncovered a distributed net-
work, which is active during roller coaster sce-
narios that are correlated with strong presence 
experience compared with the scenarios that 
are correlated with weaker presence experience. 
The network comprises extra-striate areas, the 
dorsal visual stream, the superior parietal cortex 
(SPL) and inferior parietal cortex (IPL), parts of 
the ventral visual stream, the premotor cortex 
(PMC), and the brain structures located in the 
basal and mesiotemporal parts of the brain (see 
also Figure 1 for a summary).
However, the network was differently activated 
depending on the strength of the presence feeling. 
It is found that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) played a pivotal role in the control of 
the network and the associated experience of pres-
ence. Firstly, the hemodynamic responses in the 
right-sided and left-sided DLPFC showed a strong 
negative correlation with the subjective experi-
ence of presence during the roller coaster rides 
(Figure 2). Hence, the stronger the presence expe-
rience, the lesser was the hemodynamic response 
in the DLPFC (left and right). By using effective 
connectivity analyses the authors identified a spe-
cific role of the right-sided DLPFC in the control 
of the experience of presence and the concomi-
tant hemodynamic responses in the network by 
using effective connectivity analyses. A “negative 
connectivity” between right-sided DLPFC acti-
vation and brain areas was found in the dorsal 
visual stream, extra-striate areas, the SPL and the 
IPL, and in the PMC (Figure 3). Based on this 
finding, we indicate that the right-sided DLPFC 
down-regulates the activation in the dorsal visual 
processing stream. Considering the specific role 
Presence
Presence is understood as referring  
to the subjective feeling of being  
in a virtual environment while 
transiently unaware of one’s real 
location and surroundings and of the 
technology that delivers the stream  
of virtual input to the senses
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of the dorsal stream in egocentric processing of 
the visual environment, it can be proposed that 
the right DLPFC is recruited as part of a strategy 
for regulating the experience of presence by con-
straining the egocentric processing of the roller 
coaster stimulus display. It can also be proposed 
that by increasing the activation in the dorsal 
visual stream during strong presence experience 
(with diminished activation in the right-sided 
DLPFC), the brain attentively prepares actions 
in the virtual environment as if the brain actually 
responds to real-life situations. It is known that 
the dorsal visual stream and the connected pari-
eto-frontal areas are strongly involved in action 
and movement control. Hence, the stronger the 
participants are involved in the virtual scene, the 
stronger they plan to act attentively in the virtual 
environment.
In addition to the right-sided DLPFC, there 
was some influence from the left-sided DLPFC 
in the form of positive connectivity with the 
medial PFC (including the ACC), the thalamus 
and brainstem areas, the ncl. caudatus, and the 
parahippocampal area. Considering the negative 
correlation between the presence experience and 
the activation in the left-sided DLPFC, strong 
activation of the areas is found in situations 
in which participants experience less presence, 
which means that less presence experience is 
associated with increased activation in the asso-
ciated brain areas. The medial PFC is known to 
be functionally involved in attention modulation, 
conflict monitoring, cognitive control (Botvinick 
et al., 1999; Carter et al., 1999; Ridderinkhof 
et al., 2004), and self-referential reflective activ-
ity (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Esslen et al., 2008; 
Gusnard et al., 2001). There have been discus-
sions to ascertain whether the brain areas (espe-
cially the medial PFC) are a part of a network 
involved in the control of the “default mode of 
brain function” whose activity continues during 
rest and is suspended during the performance of 
externally cued tasks (Amodio and Frith, 2006; 
Greicius et al., 2008; Gusnard et al., 2001; Rilling 
et al., 2007). It is possible that the recruitment 
of medial prefrontal regions indicates strong 
usage by adults of internal self-reflective con-
trol processes while being exposed to VE stimuli 
especially when the adults experience less pres-
ence. The subjects appear to control and regulate 
the presence experience by critically evaluating 
and monitoring the presented VE stimuli, or by 
directing their attention away from the external 
VR to internal self-reflective mental processes.
Interestingly, the above reported pattern of 
effective connectivity was only found in adults. 
In stark contrast, children demonstrated a com-
pletely different connectivity pattern. In children, 
the right DLPFC is involved in upregulation of 
the activation in subcortical and mesiotemporal 
brain regions (including hippocampus, amygdala, 
and insula), multi-sensory integration areas 
(temporo-parietal junction), and areas of the 
ventral visual processing stream (Figure 3). The 
completely different activation pattern is under-
stood to indicate a distinctly different “neural” 
strategy in children for processing the virtual 
roller coaster scenario. Considering the fact that 
most of the modulated brain regions in children, 
particularly the bilateral hippocampus and the 
areas of the ventral visual stream, are part of a net-
work involved in allocentric, object-based spatial 
processing, which is independent of the observer’s 
spatial location. Hence, it is suggested that children 
automatically use the strategy to cope up with a 
highly immersive virtual roller coaster scenario 
(Jordan et al., 2004; Nadel and Hardt, 2004). It is 
Figure 1 | Demonstration of brain areas that are more strongly activated during the 
presentation of a roller coaster scenario that evokes high presence versus low presence. 
(A) Increased hemodynamic responses overlaid on a three-dimensional (3D) rendered brain  
and two sagittal brain slices. (B) Schematic depiction of the stronger activated brain areas during 
the high presence condition.
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known that the allocentric strategy for navigation 
is typically used in children and adults who are 
not very well skilled in spatial  navigation, due to 
which the  activation pattern might reflect lower 
proficiency in spatial navigation of children (Mast 
and Jäncke, 2007). Interestingly, we found an 
upregulation of activation in the children’s brain 
areas, which are involved in emotional processing 
(amygdala, hippocampus, and insula). The activa-
tion of the areas during arousing VE experience 
strongly suggests that the children are more sus-
ceptible to the arousing impact of the visual and 
auditory spatial stimuli and are hence less able to 
regulate and control the experience of presence 
during confrontation with arousing VE. The dif-
ferences are most likely related to the prefrontal 
cortex that is not fully matured (Giedd et al., 1999; 
Gogtay et al., 2004), which is also associated with 
delayed maturation of most executive functions 
in children (Davies, et al., 2004; Segalowitz and 
Davies, 2004).
Altogether, the presence experience is cor-
related with a distinct activation pattern in a 
 distributed network. The pivotal node in the 
network is the DLPFC, with the right-sided 
part obviously down-regulating the activation 
in the dorsal visual stream, thus regulating 
and modulating the presence experience. The 
left-sided DLPFC is involved in upregulation 
of the activation of brain areas known to be 
involved in self-referential action monitoring. 
In children, there is no evidence of any strong 
modulatory influence of the DLPFC on the 
neural network involved in controlling pres-
ence. However, more activation was found in 
mesio-temporal areas including regions known 
to be involved in emotional processing. The 
conspicuous absence of any DLPFC influence 
on the connected brain areas in children most 
probably depends on the frontal cortex that 
is not matured, thus undermining the ability 
of the children to efficiently cope up with the 
Figure 2 | Correlations between subjective presence experience and the hemodynamic responses in the 
right-sided (A) and left-sided (B) DLPFC. The correlations were calculated between the mean hemodynamic response 
in the DLPFC and the subjective presence measures.
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roller coaster scenario, which leads to stronger 
emotional reactions and a more allocentric ori-
entation in the VR environment.
INFLUENCING PRESENCE BY MODULATING 
THE ACTIVATION OF THE DLPFC
Earlier studies rely on the measurement and 
analysis of the BOLD-signal, which is how-
ever slow and only correlates indirectly with 
the underlying electrical neural activation. No 
direct evidence is found that the activation pat-
tern observed is responsible for true functional 
sensing of the experience of presence. It is quite 
possible that the measured activations mostly 
represent some kind of correlated activations 
and not necessarily causal activations in the 
context of presence experience. Selective inhi-
bition or excitation of the area in the context of 
continuous presence experience would help in 
determination of the causal influence of a given 
brain area on the experience of presence. The 
scientific community is now in a good position 
to make use of transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) or transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS). This has been done in an experiment in 
which tDCS was applied to the right DLPFC to 
modulate the experience of presence while the 
participants watched a virtual roller coaster ride 
Figure 3 | (A) Network, which is down-regulated (in blue) or up-regulated (in red) by the right-sided or left-sided 
DLPFC in adults. The down-regulated brain areas show “negative connectivity” with the right-sided DLPFC implying  
that strong activation of the right-sided DLPFC is associated with reduced activation in the network (and vice versa).  
The up-regulated brain areas show “positive connectivity” with the left-sided DLPFC. (B) The network shows “positive 
connectivity” with the right-sided DLPFC and “negative connectivity” with the left-sided DLPFC in children. Actually, 
there is no down-regulation but rather an up-regulation by the right-sided DLPFC in children.
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(Beeli et al., 2008a). During the ride electroder-
mal activity, impulsiveness and subjective pres-
ence experience were measured during exposure 
to the virtual roller coaster scenario. The applica-
tion of cathodal tDCS to the right DLPFC (which 
inhibits the right-sided DLPFC) increased the 
electrodermal response to the VR stimulus, thus 
being indicative of increased vegetative arousal. 
The finding is important as it demonstrates 
that the emotional responsiveness changed as a 
function of the right-sided DLPFC activity. With 
decreased activation of the right-sided DLPFC, 
the emotional responsiveness increased during 
the virtual roller coaster ride. However, there was 
no concomitant increase in the presence expe-
rience with the increase in emotional respon-
siveness. The reason for this unexpected finding 
might be that the presence questionnaire was 
filled out after the roller coaster ride, while the 
electrodermal responses were measured during 
the ride, and that the retrospective characteriza-
tion of actual presence experience is hampered 
by the ongoing physiological effects of DLPFC 
inhibition. A further possibility is that, in this 
study, only the right-sided DLPFC was inhibited, 
although the left-sided DLPFC is also involved in 
controlling the presence experience. Hence, the 
inhibition of both the right-sided and left-sided 
DLPFC may have also modulated the subjective 
experience of presence. However, the speculation 
has to be examined in future studies.
Together, the findings indicate the level of sig-
nificance of the right-sided DLPFC in controlling 
the actions and the pivotal role of the right-sided 
DLPFC in the control of the activation of a net-
work that generates or modulates the presence 
experience. The right-sided DLPFC has been 
shown to be involved in the control of various 
behaviors, typically involved in the selection of 
relevant responses and the suppression of irrel-
evant responses (Knoch, 2007). For example, it 
has been shown that driving in a driving simu-
lator is strongly influenced by the activation of 
the DLPFC, with the DLPFC inhibition resulting 
in speeded and risky driving, while excitation of 
the DLPFC (by applying anodal tDCS) leads to 
a more careful driving style in virtual scenarios 
without the participants noticing the change in 
their driving behavior (Beeli et al., 2008b). The 
finding corresponds with a further study in which 
driving behavior in the driving simulator was 
assessed during the measurement of concomitant 
brain activation. The participants who speeded 
most and exhibited greater risk-taking behavior 
during simulated driving demonstrated less neu-
ronal activation in the anterior DLPFC (Jäncke 
et al., 2008).
A PRESENCE NETWORK?
Did we uncover a “presence network” that is 
exclusively involved in generating and  controlling 
the presence experience? No, the network 
 mentioned above is not exclusively associated 
with the modulation of presence experience. It is 
a network involved in the control of many other 
psychological functions, including top-down 
and bottom-up control of attention, spatial 
orientation, control of egocentric orientation, 
and the control of motor behavior. The studies 
mentioned above demonstrate that a particular 
network is involved in many functions, and the 
psychological specificity cannot be inferred sim-
ply by identifying the activated brain structures. 
However, this study emphasizes the key role of 
DLPFC in controlling several behavioral aspects. 
The DLPFC acts as a modulator of the network 
and also as a modulator of the concomitant psy-
chological experiences.
RELATION OF THE “RUBBER HAND ILLUSION” 
WITH OUT-OF-BODY EXPERIENCE
The “negative connectivity” in the roller coaster 
study revealed the influence of the right DPLFC 
on a frontoparietal attentional network along 
with the visual cortex is known to show enhanced 
activity during visual-spatial attention. Of par-
ticular interest is the parietal-premotor cortical 
network because of the role of the network in 
sensory-motor integration. The posterior pari-
etal cortex (PPC) integrates information from 
different sensory modalities to form a coherent 
multimodal representation of space coded in a 
body-centered reference frame. A feature of the 
coherent multimodal representation is the rep-
resentation of peripersonal visual space around 
the body as found in monkeys (Rizzolatti et al., 
1997a) and humans (Halligan and Marshall, 
1991; Makin et al., 2007). The integration of 
multisensory cues around the body in the 
peripersonal space serves to map the position of 
objects in the surrounding environment in terms 
of the own body. The PMC responds only to 
the movement of objects toward the body parts 
in the space (Graziano et al., 2002; Rizzolatti 
et al., 1997a,b), and activity in the ventral PMC 
of the macaque monkey appears to reflect poten-
tial motor actions to targets within the space. 
Gallese (2005) suggested that such a simulated 
action enables the definition of motor space rep-
resented in terms of potential motor actions to 
spatial locations.
Jeannerod et al. (1995) suggested that a visual 
target elicits a motor schema for potential action 
that maps the position of objects in the surround-
ing environment irrespective of whether the cor-
Frontiers in Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2009 | Volume 3 | Issue 1 | 58
Jäncke et al. The neural underpinnings of presence
responding action is actually executed (see also 
Baumgartner et al., 2007). It is proposed that 
the perception of spatial and motion cues (the 
human perceptual system is highly sensitive to 
motion cues) in the mediated environment of 
the roller coaster elicited, as part of a prepara-
tory motor response, motor schemas that map the 
fast “approaching” scene in the virtual scenario 
in terms of real motor space and a correspond-
ing plan for potential action. Such a plan is in 
effect a simulation of real actions, and as such 
the “goodness” of the virtual environment may 
reflect the degree to which the virtual space or a 
part of the space is represented during presence 
as a potential and also real motor space, which 
would effectively put the person “in touch” with 
the environment.
There are similarities between the experience 
of presence and the rubber hand illusion (RHI). In 
the RHI, the subject senses that the rubber hand 
and not the unseen real hand is the felt location 
of synchronous tactile stimulation of the hands 
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2005). 
Makin et al. (2008) argued that mechanisms that 
underlie peripersonal space representation are 
pivotal for the generation of the RHI. The authors 
suggested that, if the peripersonal space around 
the dummy hand is represented as a peripersonal 
hand space, the visual perception of the stroke of 
the brush on the dummy hand can be represented 
in reference frames that are centered on and asso-
ciated with the dummy hand. It was also suggested 
that the detection of the correlation between the 
visual stimulation and the tactile stimulation gen-
erates the sense of a single perceptual event. In 
addition to the proposal, the authors speculate 
that the “goodness” of the “virtual” (rubber) hand 
as an illusion may in part reflect the degree to 
which the “virtual” peripersonal space around the 
“virtual” rubber hand is represented as a potential 
and also a real motor space. Attribution of owner-
ship of the rubber hand suggests that there may be 
an associated representation of the motor space 
centered on the rubber hand, which would equally 
apply even when the RHI occurs in the absence 
of visual stimulation (Ehrsson et al., 2005). A 
representation of the potential motor space may 
have the effect of putting the person “in touch” 
with the space around the virtual hand and of 
consolidating the sense of ownership.
Recently, several studies have discussed a fur-
ther phenomenon that is important in the con-
text of the experience of presence, the so-called 
out-of-body experience (OBE). Several variants 
of the phenomenon have been described ear-
lier. For example, a completely virtual object 
(e.g., a hand or an arm) can be experienced as 
a part of one’s self under specific conditions 
in the virtual environment (Slater et al., 2008). 
Researchers have shown that the experience of the 
 conscious self can be redirected from the position 
at which it is normally located (within the body 
borders) to some other positions in space using 
 specific VR stimuli (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; 
Lenggenhager et al., 2007).
OBE has been brought into connection with 
specific activation in the TPJ (e.g., Blanke and 
Arzy, 2005; Blanke et al., 2002, 2004; Bünning 
and Blanke, 2005), a brain region that shows 
some overlap with the network to be involved in 
modulating the experience of presence (see also 
Figure 1). The TPJ (temporoparietal junction) 
processes multisensory body-related information: 
involvement of the TPJ and the regions along the 
intraparietal sulcus in multisensory integration of 
visual with tactile and proprioceptive informa-
tion within a common spatial frame of reference 
(Bremmer et al., 2001; Calvert et al., 2000; Jordan 
et al., 2001) also in the perception of the body 
and body parts (Blanke and Arzy, 2005). Together 
with the posterior insula, the TPJ also forms the 
central region of the vestibular cortex (Brandt 
and Dieterich, 1999; Fasold et al., 2002). Electrical 
stimulation of the posterior insula and retroinsula 
results in changes in body tilt and the sensation of 
changed gravitational force (Blanke et al., 2004), 
and lesions of the areas alter the perception of 
the visual vertical and rotational vertigo (Brandt 
et al., 1994). Disturbance of multisensory inte-
gration in many VE situations, such as when the 
graviceptive vestibular sensation of the stationary 
body is in conflict with the visual impression of 
changing gravitational forces in the virtual roller 
coaster, may be coded and re-mapped by the TPJ 
so as to reconcile the sensory conflict according to 
the more dominant visual stream of information. 
If the association is established, the experience 
of presence is enhanced while a lack of efficient 
re-mapping might result in “BIP”.
CONCLUSION
Presence experience evoked by a virtual roller 
coaster scenario is associated with an increase 
in activation in a distributed network, which 
includes the dorsal visual stream, parietal areas, 
and the PMC. The network is modulated by the 
DLPFC. The DLPFC activation strongly corre-
lates with the subjective presence experience (the 
stronger the DLPFC is activated, and the lesser is 
the presence experience). However, in children, 
the DLPFC exerts a different modulatory impact 
on the network. This difference is most likely 
attributable to the prefrontal cortex that is not 
fully matured in children and adults.
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